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NOTES AND COMMENTS
NOTE: Separation Agreements and
New York Public Policy
Introduction
Married parties who because of irrecon-
cilable difficulties desire to alter their re-
lationship have several courses of conduct
open to them: they may procure a divorce;
they may seek a judicial decree of separa-
tion; or they may voluntarily enter into a
separation agreement. While a divorce will
dissolve the marital bond, both the separa-
tion decree and agreement leave it intact.
In New York, separation agreements are
subject to the general rules applicable to
all contracts,1 and are under the particular
governance of Section 5-311 of the Gen-
eral Obligations Law.2 This section em-
bodies the public policy of the state that
neither a husband nor a wife may contract
to alter or dissolve their marital status.
Although this has been the declared public
policy of New York since 1896,3 its appli-
cation to concrete fact situations has been
fraught with considerable difficulty.
1 Gary v. Gary, 6 Misc. 2d 669, 670, 160 N.Y.S.2d
877, 878 (Sup. Ct.), afl'd, 4 App. Div. 2d 948,
167 N.Y.S.2d 807 (2d Dep't 1957).
2 This section was formerly contained in N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 51. See 23A McKINNEY'S GEN.
OBL. LAW § 5-3.11, commentary 116.
3 See Winter v. Winter, 191 N.Y. 462, 467, 84
N.E. 382, 384 (1908).
It is the purpose of this article to dis-
cuss these difficulties, with particular refer-
ence to separation agreements and their
tendency to alter or dissolve an existing
marriage, and also to propose a reason-
able approach toward solving them.
Development of the Law
At early common law, few separation
agreements were executed.' Three primary
factors combined to produce this dearth:
(1) the existence and influence of the
ecclesiastical courts, which had exclusive
jurisdiction of matters relating to the mari-
tal res, and which were adverse to uphold-
ing any private agreement for separation;5
(2) the persistent legal fiction that a
husband and wife were one person, and
hence could not contract with each other;6
(3) the strict public policy supporting
the sacrosanct character of marriage.7
However, separation agreements were
entered into then, as they are now, because
situations arose resulting in intolerable
hardship for one or both of the parties to
the marriage. These agreements came to
4 Peaslee, Separation Agreements Under the Eng-
lish Law, 15 HARV. L. REV. 638 (1902).
5 Ibid.
6Hendricks v. Isaacs, 117 N.Y. 411,416, 22 N.E.
1029, 1030 (1889).
7Peaslee, supra note 4, at 638-39.
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the attention of the courts because one of
the parties would not keep his bargain.8
In the case of the wife, objectionable con-
sequences would ensue upon her spouse's
repudiation of the obligation to support
under the agreement, i.e., since the con-
tract was void ab initio, due to the pro-
hibition against husband-wife contracts,
accrued payments thereunder could not
be recovered.
The courts of equity, absorbing the juris-
diction of the ecclesiastical courts, 9 recog-
nized the inequitable nature of the wife's
position. Utilizing their broad powers, they
placed another fiction in the law. If the
wife was to nominate a trustee to act for
her in contracting with the other spouse,
the resulting agreement would not be be-
tween husband and wife, but rather be-
tween the husband and a third party for
the benefit of the wife. Therefore, the
agreement would not be subject to the
proscription of contracts between married
persons. 10 These courts, however, still had
to contend with the public policy support-
ing marriage's sacrosanct character. This
was accomplished by recognizing that
where an agreement was executed after the
physical separation itself had been estab-
lished, there was no longer any public
policy to uphold.?'
Originally, in New York, the validity of
a separation agreement was therefore con-
tingent upon the existence and convergence
of four factors:
(1) that a valid cause for separation
existed;1 2
8 Id. at 640.
9 Id. at 639.
10 Winter v. Winter, supra note 3, at 470-71, 84
N.E. at 385.
11 Galusba v. Galusha, 116 N.Y. 635, 642, 22
N.E. M114, 1115-16 (1889).
"2 See Clark v. Fosdick, 118 N.Y. 7, 16, 22 N.E.
(2) that the parties to the agreement
were living apart at the time of its execu-
tion, or were immediately about to sepa-
rate;"3
(3) that the agreement was made
through the agency of a trustee; 4 and
(4) that the agreement itself was by its
nature fair and equitable.15
However, when the first Domestic Rela-
tions Law was passed, contracts between
husband and wife were therein sanc-
tioned.16 This, of course, obviated the nec-
essity for the intervention of a trustee, and
the law courts thereafter recognized and
enforced separation agreements. 17 Since the
passage of this statute, the prohibition of
contracts which tend "to alter or dissolve
the marriage," now embodied in Section
5-311 of the General Obligations Law,
has remained constant. Nevertheless, the
problem of determining which contracts
are those altering or dissolving a marriage
still presents great difficulties. Since an
examination of this statute yields little
more than a broad pronouncement of
policy, it is necessary to turn from the
legislature to the judiciary for a construc-
tion of the law.
Separation Agreements and the Courts
In general, the courts countenance sepa-
ration agreements, since the law looks with
disfavor upon unnecessary litigation, and
with favor upon amicable settlement of dis-
1111, 1114 (1889).
13 Id. at 13-14, 22 N.E. at 1113.
'-4 Winter v. Winter, supra note 3, at 470, 84 N.E.
at 385.
15 Hungerford v. Hungerford, 161 N.Y. 550, 553,
56 N.E. 117, 118 (1900).
16 DOM. REL. LAW OF 1896, ch. 272, § 21.
1' Winter v. Winter, supra note 3, at 474-75, 84
N.E. at 386-87.
putes out of court.18 Thus, the separation
agreement is both theoretically and prac-
tically desirable within our legal frame-
work. With this in mind, the New York
courts have uniformly enforced reasonable
and fair agreements and their incidental
provisions relating to custody, support and
property rights. 19 However, notwithstand-
ing the reasonableness or fairness of the
agreement, the courts will strike it down
if, on its face, or sub rosa (through the in-
strumentality of a prior or contempora-
neous contract),2" the agreement's sole
purpose is to induce one of the parties to
procure a divorce, 21 or is part of a scheme
to obtain or facilitate a divorce. 22 Indicia
of such a scheme are present when the ali-
mony payments provided in the agreement,
or other money or property payments, are
bestowed, not as support, but as a premium
or bribe for obtaining a divorce. 2
in determining which agreements are
enforceable and which are not, an analysis
of the applicable case law presents four
categories into which, ostensibly, all sepa-
ration agreements will fall:
(1) simple;
(2) contemplative;
18 Shapiro v. Shapiro, 8 App. Div. 2d 341, 342,
188 N.Y.S.2d 455, 457 (1st Dep't 1959); Besant
v. Wood, 12 Ch. D. 605, 617 (1878).
19 E.g., Haas v. Haas, 298 N.Y. 69, 72, 80 N.E.2d
337, 339 (1948).
20 If such collateral agreements were not admis-
sible in evidence, a party would have the power
to render an illegal agreement enforceable by
concealing his real objective in another contract.
Niman v. Niman, 15 Misc. 2d 1095, 1097, 181
N.Y.S.2d 260, 264 (Sup. Ct. 1958), aff'd, 8 App.
Div. 2d 793, 188 N.Y.S.2d 948 (Ist Dep't 1959).
21Schley v. Andrews, 225 N.Y. 110, 121 N.E.
812 (1919).
22 Matter of Rhinelander, 290 N.Y. 31, 37, 47
N.E.2d 681, 684 (1943).
23 Ibid.
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(3) conditional;
(4) promotive.
It will be seen that the courts are prone
to enforce the first two, but may hold the
latter two violative of section 5-311.
A. Simple and Contemplative Agreements
The simple separation agreement in-
cludes a cessation of cohabitation, but
contains no provisions concerning divorce.
Furthermore, there is no parallel agree-
ment relating to divorce. 24 As long as the
agreement was not made while the parties
were living together and the separation
did not take place because of the agree-
ment, the law will enforce it.25 This type
of agreement, since there is no provision
for divorce within or without the instru-
ment, has no tendency to alter or dissolve
the marriage bond.
The contemplative separation agreement
provides for its own continuance in the
event one of the parties should seek a
judicial separation, or a decree of absolute
divorce .2 Preservation of the effectiveness
of the instrument may be accomplished by
a clause within the instrument itself, e.g.,
"The provisions of this agreement shall not
be construed to prevent either party from
suing for an absolute divorce ...but no
decree . . . obtained by either party shall
in any way affect this agreement or any
of the terms .... ,,27 It may also be ac-
complished by a separate agreement mani-
festing the intention that if a divorce is
24 E.g., Yates v. Yates, 183 Misc. 934, 51 N.Y.S.2d
135 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
25 Clark v. Fosdick, supra note 12, at 12-14, 22
N.E. at 1112-13.
26 Marson v. Marson, 9 Misc. 2d 599, 601, 173
N.Y.S.2d 416, 419 (Sup. Ct. 1957), modified, 6
App. Div. 2d 786, 175 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1st Dep't
1958), aff'd, 6 N.Y.2d 925, 161 N.E.2d 212, 190
N.Y.S.2d 998 (1959)..
27 CLS GEN. OBL. LAW § 3-301, form 1 11 7.
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later obtained, the provisions of the ori-
ginal agreement shall survive or, in the
alternative, be incorporated as part of the
decree.2 8
This type of agreement is not void as
violative of the public policy expressed
in section 5-311 because there is no in-
ducement, in the form of consideration for
its execution, to dissolve the marriage
bond. The agreement, by prudent drafts-
manship or forethought, merely keeps its
property and support provisions intact
through and beyond any litigation which
may subsequently ensue.2 9
B. Conditional and Promotive Agreements
The conditional separation agreement is
one whose provisions either become effec-
tive or cease to be operative upon the
happening of a prearranged contingency.2 0
In the case of the agreement which is ac-
tivated, this contingency may be the pro-
curement of a divorce by the wife, whereas
in the case of the agreement which is de-
activated, this contingency may be the
non-procurement of a divorce decree.2 1
In Schley v. Andrews, 2 a husband,
in order to induce his wife to procure a
divorce, agreed to pay $200 per month
for her lifetime if she did not remarry., As
collateral security for her monthly pay-
28 Marson v. Marson, 9 Misc. 2d 599, 173 N.Y.S.
2d 416 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
29 The parties to a separation agreement, in addi-
tion to keeping its provisions intact through di-
vorce proceedings, may provide that any dispute
under the agreement be subject to arbitration.
Lasek v. Lasek, 13 App. Div. 2d 242, 244, 215
N.Y.S.2d 983, 985 (1st Dep't 1961).
30 Compare Temple v. Liebmann, 17 Misc. 2d
740, 741, 186 N.Y.S.2d 533, 535 (Sup. Ct. 1959),
with Butler v. Marcus, 264 N.Y. 519, 191 N.E.
544 (1934) (memorandum decision).
31 Ibid.
32 Supra note 21.
ments, the husband confessed judgment
for $35,000. The agreement also provided
that if the wife did not procure a decree
of divorce, both the agreement and con-
fession of judgment would have no effect.
After the entry of a divorce decree, the
husband made several payments, but dis-
continued after the wife's remarriage. The
wife then entered judgment on the confes-
sion and the husband brought an action to
enjoin the collection of said judgment. In
granting the injunction, the court reasoned
that the original agreement and confession,
being founded on an illegal consideration
(inducing the wife to obtain a divorce),
were both void. Consequently, the judg-
ment entered on them was also invalid.
This agreement clearly contravenes pub-
lic policy since the wife gains no benefit
from the contract unless the marriage is
dissolved." Such a contingent agreement
may be further labeled as promotive, since
its natural tendency is to induce the pro-
curement of a divorce which would not
otherwise have occurred.34  Promotive
agreements35 consequently contravene Sec-
tion 5-311 of the General Obligations Law
and are invalid.
However, not all contingent agreements
are within the prohibitory scope of the
statute. Evidence may be introduced which
will indicate that an agreement is non-
promotive and consequently enforceable.
In Hammerstein v. Equitable Trust Co.,3
33 Ibid.; Lake v. Lake, 136 App. Div. 47, 49-50,
119 N.Y. Supp. 686, 688 (3d Dep't 1909)
(dictum).
34 See Viles v. Viles, 14 N.Y.2d 365, 370, 200
N.E.2d 567, 570, 251 N.Y.S.2d 672, 676 (1964)
(dissenting opinion); Yates v. Yates, supra note
24.
"5E.g., Gould v. Gould, 261 App. Div. 733, 27
N.Y.S.2d 54 (1st Dep't 1941).
30 156 App. Div. 644, 141 N.Y. Supp. 1065 (1st
Dep't), afl'd, 209 N.Y. 429, 103 N.E. 706 (1913).
the husband agreed to pay $200 weekly
to a trust company for the use of his wife
or, in the event of her death, for the use of
his daughters. Although this agreement
was contingent upon the procurement of a
final decree of divorce, it was deemed valid
and binding since the evidence showed that
it was executed subsequent to the com-
mencement of divorce proceedings. Thus,
evidence of a pending divorce action is
sufficient to prove the non-promotive na-
ture of an agreement.' 7 Other evidence may
also take a contingent agreement outside
the scope of section 5-311. For example,
evidence indicating that at the time the
agreement was entered into the spouse
had already decided to obtain a divorce
may be adequate to prove it non-promo-
tive.' s
Application of Section 5-311
Is there a thread running through these
agreements which may be used to draw
them together and render them more sus-
ceptible to accurate analysis? Turning
again to the statute, it appears that it
could not possibly be directed against di-
vorce, as such, for the state, upon proper
grounds, will grant a decree of divorce.' 9
Therefore, it would seem that it was also
not intended to prohibit parties, already
desirous of divorce and having grounds
therefor, from executing an agreement set-
tling their affairs which is merely contin-
gent upon the procurement of a divorce.4
"7Yates v. Yates, supra note 24, at 938-39, 51
N.Y.S.2d at 139-40.
38 Cf. Howard v. Adams, 16 Cal. 2d 256, 105
P.2d 971 (1940).
39 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170.
40 E.g., Hamlin v. Hamlin, 224 App. Div. 168,
230 N.Y. Supp. 51 (4th Dep't 1928); Hammer-
stein v. Equitable Trust Co., 156 App. Div. 644,
141 N.Y. Supp. 1065 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 209 N.Y.
429, 103 N.E. 706 (1913).
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The policy underlying section 5-311 is
the prohibition of any agreement which
will promote a divorce that was not desired
by both parties before the agreement was
made. Where -the reluctant party is induced
to assent to divorce because of an agree-
ment, such agreement is promotive and
necessarily invalid in view of the statute."
But how is a court to determine, in the
face of conflicting testimony, whether the
agreement is essentially promotive?
New York seems to rely heavily upon
evidence found within the agreement itself
when determining its promotive or non-
promotive nature.4 2 Under this approach,
the courts primarily concentrate on the
financial provisions and, when they are
substantially in excess of what a divorce
court would allow, the agreement may be
held promotive and therefore invalid. 4 3
However useful this evidence may be in
some cases, it may prove irrelevant in
others. For example, in Hammerstein,
evidence of the financial benefits conferred
by the agreement appeared to be a rela-
tively unimportant factor in the face of evi-
dence which proved that a divorce pro-
ceeding was already pending at the time
the agreement was executed. Furthermore,
indiscriminate reliance on this method of
construction, even in cases where it is ap-
plicable, may prove harmful and restrictive
since a court, by focusing upon the agree-
ment itself, is narrowly confining its at-
tention to but one of many factors which
may have a substantial bearing on the issue
in question.
An alternative approach is found in those
jurisdictions which rely primarily upon evi-
41 Schley v. Andrews, supra note 21.
42 Yates v. Yates, supra note 24, at 939, 51 N.Y.S.
2d at 140.
43 ibid.
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dence found without the agreement. 44
Under this procedure, evidence on the is-
sue of whether or not the traditionally rec-
ognized ends of marriage are still capable
of attainment is controlling. Thus, where
the court finds that those ends are no
longer attainable, it will enforce an agree-
ment contingent upon divorce. Although
this approach appears to be less confining
than New York's, its usefulness to New
York courts is questionable. In cases where
the recognized goals of marriage are
deemed unattainable, New York courts
would probably be justified in enforcing
the agreement since it evidently was not
the primary inducement for the subsequent
divorce. However, such an approach is
ineffective in determining whether or not
an agreement is promotive where a court
initially finds that the possibility of realiz-
ing the purposes of marriage has not been
wholly destroyed. Surely, the parties in
such a case may have decided to dissolve
their marriage in spite of that possibility
without being influenced in any way by
the separation agreement.
Although both these approaches are
legitimate attempts at solving a difficult
construction problem, it seems that neither
attains the universality of application and
flexibility necessary to make it truly useful.
It is submitted that there is a procedure
which, if followed, will prove helpful to
courts in applying section 5-311. In the
first instance, the courts should pose this
question: Would the divorce have occurred
if there had been no separation agreement?
If the answer is clearly in the affirmative,
the agreement should be upheld, since it
apparently was not the primary promoting
44Hill v. Hill, 23 Cal. 2d 82, 142 P.2d 417
(1943).
factor in the subsequent divorce. If clearly
answerable in the negative, it should be
denied effect, since it is promoting a di-
vorce which would not otherwise occur,
and it seems that this is specifically what
section 5-311 is designed to prevent. How-
ever, when the answer is not clearly ap-
parent, the courts should avoid relying on
restrictive approaches which, as is the case
in New York, may prove either limited
in application or confining. Such an ap-
proach may result in diverting the court's
attention from factors which are truly rele-
vant and in focusing it inordinately on
others which may not warrant such con-
centration.
Illustrative of this proposition is Viles
v. Viles, 45 a recent New York Court of
Appeals decision. There, the husband and
wife entered into a separation agreement,
valid on its face. The husband also orally
agreed to pay his wife's travelling expenses
to the Virgin Islands in order for her to
procure a divorce; in addition, he agreed
to pay her counsel fees. The signing of the
separation agreement was conditioned up-
on the wife's going to the Virgin Islands
to obtain the divorce. The majority of the
court seemed to hold that the agreement
to pay travel expenses and counsel fees per
se invalidated the separation agreement.
Thus, the majority, in focusing its attention
primarily on the benefits provided by the
agreement, seems to have overlooked the
real intention of section 5-311. Certainly,
if the wife was going to obtain a divorce
in any event, an agreement granting her
travel and counsel fees would not con-
travene New York's policy.4 Thus, any
45 14 N.Y.2d 365, 200 N.E.2d 567, 251 N.Y.S.2d
672 (1964).
46Yates v. Yates, supra note 24, at 938, 51
N.Y.S.2d at 139.
holding which implies that such an agree-
ment per se contravenes section 5-311 ap-
pears inconsistent with the true intent of
the statute,' 7 viz., the proscription of only
those contracts which tend to induce di-
vorce or separation proceedings which
would not have occurred in their absence.
The dissenting opinion in Viles45 ap-
pears to recognize this inconsistency and
hence criticizes the majority's impractical
approach. The minority concluded that the
payment of travel expenses and counsel
fees was not what precipitated the divorce,
since it did not have a manifest tendency
to promote a divorce which would not
otherwise have occurred. 49 Instead of rely-
ing on the inflexible approach of the ma-
jority, they appear to have weighed all the
evidence educed, consequently finding that
there existed an irrevocable breach be-
tween the parties.50 Perhaps if the majority
had taken a less restrictive approach and
had not relied so heavily on the provisions
within the agreement, the result would
have been the opposite.
Conclusion
Undoubtedly, there is a close, if not
direct, relationship between the perma-
nency and sanctity of marriage and the
stability of society. The law holds mar-
4 Cf. Tanburn v. Tanburn, 114 N.Y.S.2d 670
(Sup. Ct. 1952). Such a holding also appears in-
consistent with the approach taken in other juris-
dictions. See Howard v. Adams, 16 Cal. 2d 256,
105 P.2d 971 (1940); see also Reighley v. Con-
tinental 111. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 323 II1. App.
479, - , 56 N.E.2d 328, 330 (1944), afl'd, 390
I1. 242, 61 N.E.2d 29 (1945).
48Viles v. Viles, supra note 34, at 367, 200
N.E.2d at 569, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 674.
49 Id. at 370, 200 N.E.2d at 570, 251 N.Y.S.2d at
676.
50Id. at 368, 200 N.E.2d at 570, 251 N.Y.S.2d
at 674.
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riage in high esteem, and has an abhor-
rence of contracts which tend to dissolve
the marital bond. However, the state will
grant a divorce when it believes that so-
ciety's interest will be promoted thereby.
Thus, there is no public policy militating
against an agreement contingent on the
dissolution of a marriage already in ex-
tremis, where the parties have legal
grounds and both desire divorce. Such an
agreement cannot be considered the pro-
moting cause of a divorce which would
not otherwise occur, for the parties, if
financially able and not religiously bound,
will in any event proceed to sever their
marital ties'
In addition, if these parties are not al-
lowed to settle their affairs beforehand,
they must engage in an adversary proceed-
ing in which their most personal and inti-
mate problems and emotions are exposed.
2
Section 5-311 should not frustrate the
parties' attempts to privately settle their
affairs. Since the participants in a divorce
action, which is not solely the result of the
execution of a separation agreement, know
and understand the ramifications of their
situation, they are more perfectly equipped
51 Foreword to LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS
AND ANTE-NUPTIAL CONTRACTS at v-vi (1964).
52 See Alexander, The Follies of Divorce: A
Therapeutic Approach to the Problem, 36
A.B.A.J. 105, 107 (1950). However, at present,
there are twenty states which allow voluntary
separation for a certain period to serve as a basis
upon which divorces are granted. Kohut, Family
Courts and Separation Statutes: Correlatives or
Non-Correlatives, 4 J. FAM. L. 71, 72 (1964).
There are excellent materials available to the
Catholic attorney who becomes involved in di-
vorce or separation litigation. E.g., Dailey, The
Catholic Attorney and the Moral Lawfulness of
the Civil Divorce Case, 38 U. DET. L.J. 255
(1961); Hiegel, Ready Rules of Morality for
Civil A ction of Separation and Divorce, 11 Loy-
OLAL. REV. 37 (1962).
 
